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Abstract
This study examines growth cycles in a simple discrete-time two-country model of in-
novation. In this setting, we nd that there are two key driving forces that give rise to
cycles. They are perfect international capital mobility and perfect international knowledge
spillovers. In addition, this study shows that the opening of trade can create cycles in both
countries, whereas pretrade equilibrium in each country initially jumps to the steady state.
That is, our results are characteristic of an open-economy framework.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that long-run growth in developed countries uctuates. Many studies argue that
endogenous cycles are a primary explanation for this fact. In R&D-based models, a number
of studies have undertaken theoretical investigations of the existence of endogenous cycles.1
However, these investigations are conned to a closed-economy framework. In reality, developed
countries increase international globalization and market integration. Thus, the investigation
of endogenous cycles should be conducted within an open-economy framework.
Few studies have considered endogenous cycles using R&D-based models in an open econ-
omy. Furukawa (2015) develops a two-country growth model that can capture how economic
leadership endogenously moves between countries along an equilibrium path. In the model, the
knowledge accumulation in each country occurs via domestic innovation and spillovers from for-
eign innovation through foreign direct investment (FDI). Furukawa (2015) shows that knowledge
spillovers from foreign innovation are the key driving force behind growth cycles. Iwaisako and
Tanaka (2013) examine growth cycles in a North-South product-cycle model with overlapping
generations. They show that perpetual uctuations in the world growth rate are generated by
the interaction between innovation and imitation.
The objective of this study is to show that there are endogenous growth cycles even in
a simple discrete-time two-country model, following Grossman and Helpman's (1991) variety
expansion model. In this setting, we nd that there are two driving forces that give rise to cycles.
One is perfect international capital mobility and the other is perfect international knowledge
spillovers. First, perfect international capital mobility requires that the sum of the dividend
rate and the rate of capital gains must be equalized between both countries. This equalization
generates cycles if the wage rates are unequalized between both countries along the equilibrium
path. Second, the domestic country enjoys knowledge spillovers from foreign innovation and
can achieve faster innovation. As a result, this can generate cycles, even if the wage rates are
equalized between both countries along the equilibrium path.
With regard to another result, we show that the opening of trade can create cycles in both
countries. In a closed-economy model, Haruyama (2009) shows that cycles can emerge even
in the simple R&D-based model, following Grossman and Helpman's (1991) variety expansion
1See Shleifer (1986), Gale (1996), Deissenberg and Nyssen (1998), Francois and Shi (1999), Freeman et al.
(1999), Matsuyama (1999), Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003, 2008, 2009), Walde (2005), Furukawa (2007), and
Haruyama (2009).
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model. The important assumptions imposed in Haruyama (2009) are, rst, discrete time and,
second, risk-neutral consumers (i.e., the utility function takes a linear form).2 However, in
this study, pretrade equilibrium in each country initially jumps to the steady state because the
utility function takes a log form. Thus, our results are characteristic of an open economy. In
a related study, Nishimura et al. (2014) show a similar result to this study.3 They consider
a two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium model with CRRA utility functions,
asymmetric technologies across countries, and decreasing returns to scale in the production of
all goods. They show that opening to free trade can create persistent endogenous uctuations
at the global level, even if each country's closed-economy equilibrium is saddle-point stable.4
However, their model is not an R&D-based model and the mechanism of cycles is dierent from
ours.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the model used in this
study. Section 3 derives the steady state and the dynamic system of the economy. Section 4
examines the local dynamics of the economy. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Time is discrete. We follow the R&D-based endogenous growth model with expanding variety
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The model consists of two countries, A and B. Each country
engages in two activities: (1) production of dierentiated goods using workers and (2) R&D
conducted by workers. The two countries' population sizes are LA and LB. Each individual
supplies one unit of labor inelastically in every period and has perfect foresight.
2.1 Consumers
All consumers in country i 2 fA;Bg maximize their lifetime utility:
U i 
1X
t=0
t logCit ;
where Cit represents the temporary utility derived from the consumption of a composite good
and  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Each consumer in both countries consumes dierentiated
2Furthermore, Haruyama (2009) shows that cycles can emerge if the utility function takes a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) form and the degree of relative risk aversion is suciently small.
3In addition, Nishimura et al. (2006, 2009) show similar results.
4The closed economy model of Nishimura et al. (2014) has potential for endogenous uctuations. They show
that the restrictions of endogenous uctuations can be loosened through international trade.
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goods produced in both countries. Cit is given by
Cit =
Z nt
0
cit(j)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
;
where cit(j) denotes the consumption of good j in country i. n
i
t indicates the number of varieties
produced in country i and nt  nAt + nBt . " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any
two products. Denoting the expenditure of consumers in country i as Eit =
R nt
0 pt(j)c
i
t(j)dj, the
demand function for good j becomes
cit(j) =
pt(j)
 "EitR nt
0 pt(u)
1 "du
;
where pt(j) is the price of good j. PD;t is the price index dened as PD;t =
 R nt
0 pt(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 " .
Substituting the demand function into Cit , we obtain
Cit =
Eit
PD;t
:
We assume perfect international capital mobility, and thus, the rate of return on assets is
equalized between both countries. The maximization problem for each consumer in country i
is as follows:
max U i
subject to Ait+1 = (1 + rt)A
i
t + w
i
t   Eit ;
where Ait, rt, and w
i
t represent consumers' asset holdings in country i, the rate of return on assets,
and the wage rate in country i, respectively. Solving the intertemporal utility maximization,
we obtain the Euler equation:
1 + rt+1 =
Eit+1
Eit
:
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we normalize Et = E
A
t L
A + EBt L
B = 1 for all t so
that 1 + rt+1 = 1= holds.
2.2 Production
This economy has no transportation costs or taris. Labor is immobile across countries. We
assume that each dierentiated good is produced by a single rm because the good is innitely
protected by a patent and the good must be produced in the country in which they were
developed. Furthermore, we assume that the production sector is monopolistically competitive
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and one unit of labor input produces one unit of a dierentiated good. The total demand
function is xt(j) = c
A
t (j)L
A + cBt (j)L
B. This implies that the rm manufacturing good j
charges the following price:
pt(j) = p
i
t =
"
"  1w
i
t:
Therefore, all goods produced in country i are priced equally. This pricing rule yields the total
demand function and the monopoly prots of a rm as follows:
xt(j) = x
i
t =
"  1
"
 
wit
 "
nAt
 
wAt
1 "
+ nBt
 
wBt
1 " ; (1)
t(j) = 
i
t =
1
"  1w
i
tx
i
t: (2)
2.3 R&D
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), an entrepreneur in country i devotes a=Kit units of
labor at time t to develop a new variety of good. a is R&D productivity and Kit represents
the knowledge stock in country i. In empirical studies, Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et
al. (2009) nd that both foreign and domestic knowledge spillovers have signicant impacts
on the level of total factor productivity. We adopt this result. Suppose that knowledge results
from the R&D activities and knowledge moves freely and rapidly throughout the global research
community. With perfect international knowledge spillovers, we assume Kit = nt. We let v
i
t
denote the market value of a successful innovation in country i. The R&D sector is assumed to
be competitive and the free entry condition is as follows:
vit =
awit
nt
if nit+1   nit > 0: (3)
The shareholders of the stocks earn dividends it+1 and capital gains or losses v
i
t+1   vit. Under
the assumption of perfect international capital mobility, we obtain the following no-arbitrage
conditions:
1 + rt+1 =
1

=
it+1
vit
+
vit+1
vit
: (4)
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2.4 Market clearing condition
The labor in country i is used for production and R&D in country i. The labor market clearing
condition in country i becomes
nitx
i
t + az
i
tg
i
t = L
i; (5)
where zit  nit=nt is the share of goods manufactured in country i and git  (nit+1 nit)=nit is the
growth rate of dierentiated goods in country i.
3 Market equilibrium
3.1 Steady state
We rst study properties of the steady state. We let denote the world innovation rate by
gt  (nt+1  nt)=nt. The steady state is dened as the innovation rates in both countries being
constant and identical: (nit+1   nit)=nit = ~g. Tildes represent variables in the steady state. We
show in Appendix A that such a steady state is a unique form of equilibrium if and only if
(vit+1   vit)=vit =  gt=(1 + gt). Furthermore, we show that steady state values are as follows:
~zi =
Li
L
;
~g =
L  a("  1)(1  )
a("  1 + ) ;
~w = ~wA = ~wB =
"  1 + 
"(L+ a  a) ;
(6)
where L  LA + LB.
3.2 Dynamic system
In this subsection, we derive the dynamic system in the economy. (1), (3), and (5) imply
zitg
i
t =
Li
a
  "  1
"a
zit
 
wit
 "
zAt
 
wAt
1 "
+ zBt
 
wBt
1 "  i(wAt ; wBt ; zAt ): (7)
Note that the denition of zit implies z
B
t = 1  zAt . gt = zAt gAt + zBt gBt and (7) yield
gt =
L
a
  "  1
"a
zAt
 
wAt
 "
+ zBt
 
wBt
 "
zAt
 
wAt
1 "
+ zBt
 
wBt
1 "   (wAt ; wBt ; zAt ): (8)
From the denitions of zAt and g
A
t , we obtain
zAt+1 =
A(wAt ; w
B
t ; z
A
t ) + z
A
t
1 +  (wAt ; w
B
t ; z
A
t )
 (wAt ; wBt ; zAt ): (9)
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By using (1), (2), and (3), the no-arbitrage condition (4) becomes
1

h
1+ (wAt ; w
B
t ; z
A
t )
i
=
1
"awit
 
wit+1
1 "
(wAt ; w
B
t ; z
A
t )
 
wAt+1
1 "
+

1 (wAt ; wBt ; zAt )
 
wBt+1
1 "+wit+1wit :
(10)
Equations (9) and (10) formulate the autonomous dynamic system with respect to wAt , w
B
t , and
zAt .
4 Local dynamics
We examine the local dynamics around the steady state. In this study, we focus on the steady
state with a positive growth rate. Therefore, in the local dynamics analysis around the steady
state, the positive innovation rates in both countries are ensured; that is, (3) holds in both
countries along the transitional dynamics. By using (6), (7), and (8), we approximate (9) and
(10) linearly around the steady state. As shown in Appendix B, we obtain the following linear
system: 0@w^At+1w^Bt+1
z^At+1
1A =
0@J1 J2 0J3 J4 0
J5  J5 J6
1A0@w^Atw^Bt
z^At
1A ; (11)
where
J1 = + J3; J2 =  
("  1) La + 1  LBa


"  ("  1)La
	 ;  = La + "
"  ("  1)La
;
J3 =  
("  1) La + 1  LAa


"  ("  1)La
	 ; J4 = + J2;
J5 =
("  1)(+ "  1)LALB
(L+ "a)L2
~w 2"; J6 =
"  ("  1)La

 
L
a + "
 :
(w^At ; w^
B
t ; z^
A
t ) denotes a sequence of deviations from the steady state and Ji denote entities in
the Jacobian matrix of this system. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, J , are dened as
i (i = 1; 2; 3). Here, 1, 2, and 3 are the roots of the characteristic equation,
 
    J2  
J3
 
     J6 = 0. To check stability, we solve the characteristic equation and obtain its
roots as follows:
1 =
L
a + 1

> 1; 2 =
L
a + "
"  ("  1)La
; 3 =
"  ("  1)La
(La + ")
< 1:
1 is an unstable root. Then, we have to investigate the other characteristic roots. Figure
1 shows the relationship between 2 and 3 in ("; L=a) space.
5 Here, we assume " > 2 for
5A detailed derivation is shown in Appendix C.
7
simplicity.6 From the steady state value ~g, the line L=a = ("   1)(1   )= implies that the
growth rate is zero at the steady state. Therefore, we focus on the region L=a > (" 1)(1 )=
where the steady state growth rate is positive. Note that wAt and w
B
t are jump variables and z
A
t
is a predetermined variable. In region (A), 2 > 1 and 0 < 3 < 1 imply that the steady state
is stable and the equilibrium path is monotonic. In region (B), 2 <  1 and  1 < 3 < 0 imply
that the steady state is stable and the equilibrium path uctuates. In region (C), 2 <  1 and
3 <  1 imply that the steady state is unstable and the equilibrium path uctuates. In region
(D),  1 < 2 < 0 and 3 <  1 imply that the steady state is stable and the equilibrium path
uctuates.
Figure 1: The relationship between 2 and 3 in ("; L=a) space.
As shown in Grandmont (2008), we can reduce a bifurcation analysis to a simple one-
dimensional invariant manifold. If a ip bifurcation occurs, one eigenvalue i goes through
 1. In this study, there are two cases: if L=a = "(1 + )=("   2) holds, 2 is  1, and if
L=a = 2"=("  1  ) holds, 3 is  1. In both cases, we observe a ip bifurcation. In addition,
there generically exist stable or unstable two-period cycles on one side of the bifurcation points.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
6This assumption is in the range of empirically plausible parameters. A detailed discussion is provided in
Haruyama (2009).
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Proposition 1
A ip bifurcation will generically occur for L=a = "(1 + )=("  2) or L=a = 2"=("  1  ).
Haruyama (2009) shows that endogenous cycles do not occur in a closed economy if the
utility function is the log form. In this study, each country's closed-economy equilibrium, in
which capital mobility and knowledge spillover are not allowed, jumps to the steady state
initially. Hence, the opening of trade can create endogenous cycles in both countries.
We discuss the mechanism of cycles in the following subsections. The key driving forces
behind cycles are perfect international capital mobility and perfect international knowledge
spillovers.
4.1 Cycles generated by perfect international capital mobility
To understand the mechanism of cycles, it is helpful to consider the local dynamics converging
to the steady state. Solving the linear dierence equation (11) yields70@w^Atw^Bt
z^At
1A = 1(1)t
0@11
0
1A+2(2)t
0@ 1 LA
LB


1A+3(3)t
0@00
1
1A ; (12)
where 
  (LB LA)J5=( J6)LB and i are constants determined by the initial and terminal
conditions. 1 > 1 implies 1 = 0.
For an economy in which ("; L=a) is in region (D), we obtain 2 = (z
A
0   ~zA)=
 and 3 = 0.
(12) is rewritten as follows:
wAt = ~w +
zA0   ~zA


(2)
t;
wBt = ~w  
(zA0   ~zA)LA

LB
(2)
t;
zAt = ~z
A + (zA0   ~zA)(2)t:
From (3), the relationship between vAt and v
B
t is the same as that between w
A
t and w
B
t . In this
case, wAt ? wBt implies that vAt ? vBt , wAt+1 7 wBt+1, and vAt+1 7 vBt+1 hold, and thus, cycles
arise. The mechanism of the cycles is as follows. From (1), (2), (3), and (4), the unequal wage
rates imply that the sum of the dividend rate it+1=v
i
t and the rate of capital gains v
i
t+1=v
i
t must
be equalized between both countries; that is, vAt+1=v
A
t ? vBt+1=vBt implies At+1=vAt 7 Bt+1=vBt .
We show in Appendix E that this relationship generates cycles. Therefore, the cycles are
7A detailed derivation is shown in Appendix D.
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generated by perfect international capital mobility if the wage rates are not equalized between
both countries.
We then consider why the cycles occur in region (D). By using (1) and (2), the monopoly
prot is
it+1 =
1
"nt(1 + gt)
 
wit+1
1 "
zAt+1
 
wAt+1
1 "
+ zBt+1
 
wBt+1
1 " : (13)
From Figure 1, region (D) implies that " and L=a are suciently high. A higher " implies
that the monopoly price is lower and the monopoly prot is lower. From (8), a higher L=a
implies that the growth rate, gt, is higher. In the variety expansion model, new goods displace
the monopoly prots of old goods. Thus, a higher growth rate yields lower monopoly prots.
Furthermore, from (13), the uctuation of the wage rate implies that the monopoly prot also
uctuates. By using these results, if " and L=a are suciently high, the uctuation of the
monopoly prot caused by the uctuation of the wage rate becomes smaller. In addition, this
makes the uctuation of capital gains smaller because the sum of it+1=v
i
t and v
i
t+1=v
i
t must
be equalized between both countries. As a result, a uctuating equilibrium path exists that
converges to the steady state. On the other hand, the abovementioned uctuation becomes
larger if " and L=a are suciently low; that is, ("; L=a) is in regions (A), (B), or (C). In this
case, cycles caused by perfect international capital mobility are unstable (i.e., 2 <  1). As
shown in the next subsection, the wage rates are equalized between both countries to satisfy
the equal rate of return on equity if 2 <  1 holds.
4.2 Cycles generated by perfect international knowledge spillovers
We now consider the case in which ("; L=a) is in regions (A) or (B). In this case, we obtain
2 = 0 and 3 = z
A
0   ~zA. (12) is rewritten as follows:
wAt = w
B
t = ~w;
zAt = ~z
A + (zA0   ~zA)(3)t:
For an economy in which ("; L=a) is in region (B), cycles arise. Because the wage rates are
equalized between both countries along the equilibrium path, At = 
B
t and v
A
t = v
B
t hold for
all t, and thus, the source of the cycles is not perfect international capital mobility. The cycles
are generated by perfect international knowledge spillovers. The mechanism of the cycles is as
follows. Suppose that " and L=a are suciently high and zAt < ~z
A. zAt +z
B
t = 1 yields z
B
t > ~z
B.
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A higher " implies that the monopoly price is lower and the labor demand for production
is larger. A higher L=a implies that the eective labor force becomes larger and innovation
activities are accelerated. Thus, from zAt < ~z
A, zBt > ~z
B, and the labor market clearing
condition, country B allocates more resources to production. Country A enjoys the knowledge
spillovers freely and can achieve faster innovation. gAt > g
B
t holds and the dierence between g
A
t
and gBt is suciently large. As a result, an increase in z
A
t+1 becomes larger. z
A
t+1 > ~z
A and zBt+1 <
~zB hold. Then, at time t + 1, country A allocates more resources to production and country
B can achieve faster innovation from international knowledge spillovers. Therefore, zAt+2 < ~z
A
and zBt+2 > ~z
B hold. This process occurs repeatedly along the equilibrium path. However, if "
and L=a are much higher, cycles caused by perfect international knowledge spillovers become
unstable; that is, 3 <  1 holds.
5 Conclusion
We examined the existence of growth cycles using the simple discrete-time two-country model
with log utility following Grossman and Helpman's (1991) variety expansion model. Our main
result shows that if perfect international capital mobility and perfect international knowledge
spillovers are allowed, then endogenous cycles based on a ip bifurcation can arise.
This study has potential to be extended in several directions. First, in order to keep the
analysis tractable, we chose as simple a model as possible. It would be interesting to investigate
how the presence of heterogeneous preferences and technologies between the two countries aect
the existence of the conditions of growth cycles. In addition, we could introduce R&D subsidies
or patent breadth. If these policy variables were asymmetric, the symmetry between the two
countries would become broken. Second, it would be useful to examine how changes in the
eciency of international knowledge spillovers alter the existence of the conditions of growth
cycles. In this study, we assumed perfect international knowledge spillovers, as expressed by
Kit = n
i
t+n
j
t . We could loosen this assumption as follows: K
i
t = n
i
t+n
j
t , where  2 [0; 1] is the
eciency of international knowledge spillovers. Future research should examine this problem.
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Appendix
A. Condition of the steady state
In this Appendix, we show that if countries innovate at the same rate, (nit+1   nit)=nit = gt, the
necessary and sucient conditions for the steady state to be in a unique form of equilibrium
are (vit+1   vit)=vit =  gt=(1 + gt). From (1), (3), and (5), we obtain
git =
Li
azit
  "  1
"
(vit)
 "
nAt (v
A
t )
1 " + nBt (vBt )1 "
: (A.1)
(1), (2), (3), and (4) yield
vit+1
vit
=
1

  1
"vit
(vit+1)
1 "
nAt+1(v
A
t+1)
1 " + nBt+1(vBt+1)1 "
: (A.2)
We rst consider sucient conditions. Suppose that (nit+1 nit)=nit = gt and (vit+1 vit)=vit =
 gt=(1 + gt). By using (A.2), we obtain
vt = v
A
t = v
B
t : (A.3)
From (A.1) and (A.3), we obtain
gt =
Li
azit
  "  1
"
1
ntvt
: (A.4)
(A.4) and zAt + z
B
t = 1 result in
zit =
Li
LA + LB
: (A.5)
(A.2) and (A.3) imply
1

(gt + 1  ) = 1
"ntvt
: (A.6)
By using (3), (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6), the innovation rate and the wage rate become
~g =
(LA + LB)  a("  1)(1  )
a("  1 + ) ;
~w =
"  1 + 
"(LA + LB + a  a) :
Thus, we conrm that the economy is in the steady state.
Next, we consider necessary conditions. Suppose that the economy is in the steady state.
By using (A.1), we obtain
~g =
LA
a~zA
 
" 1
"
nAt v
A
t +
  vAt
vBt
"
nBt v
B
t
=
LB
a~zB
 
" 1
" vBt
vAt
"
nAt v
A
t + n
B
t v
B
t
:
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In the steady state, the respective second terms are constant. We dene the constant values A
and B as
A  nAt vAt +

vAt
vBt
"
nBt v
B
t and 
B 

vBt
vAt
"
nAt v
A
t + n
B
t v
B
t :
From these denitions, the relative rm values are as follows:
vAt = v
B
t ; where  

A
B
 1
"
:
Thus, the growth rates of rm values in both countries are identical. As a result, we can conrm
that (A.2) yields (A.3); that is, A = B. Finally, we derive the growth rates of rm values. By
using (3), we obtain
vit+1   vit
vit
=
nt
nt+1
  1 =   ~g
1 + ~g
:
Hence, this proves the necessary condition.
B. Derivation of the Jacobian matrix
By using (6), (7), and (8), we approximate (9) and (10) linearly in the neighborhood of the
steady state as follows:0@ ~w "    1  1 0 2 ~w "    2 0
0 0 1
1A0@w^At+1w^Bt+1
z^At+1
1A =
0@1 2 +  3 1 1 01
 2
1
 1 +  3 0
 4   4  5
1A0@w^Atw^Bt
z^At
1A ;
where
 1 =
("  1)(La + 1  )LB
("  1 + )L ~w
 ";  2 =
("  1)(La + 1  )LA
("  1 + )L ~w
 ";
 3 =
L
a + "
"  1 +  ~w
 ";  4 =
("  1)(+ "  1)LALB
(L+ "a)L2
~w 2";  5 =
"  ("  1)La

 
L
a + "
 :
The Jacobian matrix is given by
J =
1
 6
0@ ~w "    2   1 0  2 ~w "    1 0
0 0  6
1A0@1 2 +  3 1 1 01
 2
1
 1 +  3 0
 4   4  5
1A ;
where  6 = ( ~w
 "    1)( ~w "    2)   1 2.
C. The relationship between 2 and 3
In this Appendix, we consider the relationship between 2 and 3 in (";
L
a ) space to illustrate
Figure 1. We assume " > 2 for simplicity and empirical plausibility. First, we investigate the
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region in which the steady state growth rate is positive. From the steady state growth rate, the
region in which ~g > 0 is as follows:
L
a
>
("  1)(1  )

: (C.1)
We rewrite 2 and 3 as follows:
2 =
L
a + "
"  ("  1)La
; 3 =
"  ("  1)La
(La + ")
< 1:
By using 2, we obtain
2 ? 0 , L
a
7 "
"  1 ;
2 R 1 , L
a
R 1  ; (C.2)
2 R  1 , L
a
R "(1 + )
"  2 :
From " > 2, we obtain
("  1)(1  )

  (1  ) = (1  )("  1  )

> 0: (C.3)
(C.1), (C.2), and (C.3) imply that the region in which ~g > 0 does not contain the region in
which 0 < 2 < 1. From these results, we can depict Figure A.1. We then examine the existence
of the region in which 2 > 1. From Figure A.1, this condition is as follows:
2  1  

=
22 +   1

> 0:
Therefore, 22 +    1 > 0 holds if  > ( 1 +p5)=4. This parameter range is economically
plausible because ( 1 +p5)=4  0:309.
By using 3, we obtain
3 R 0 , L
a
Q "
"  1 ;
3 R  1 , L
a
Q 2"
"  1  :
From these results, we can depict Figure A.2.
Finally, in order to illustrate Figure 1, we consider whether the curve L=a = "(1+)=(" 2)
is above the curve L=a = 2"=("  1  ) as follows:
"(1 + )
"  2  
2"
"  1   =
(1  )("  1 + )
("  2)("  1  ) > 0:
14
Figure A.1: The value of 2 in ("; L=a) space. Figure A.2: The value of 3 in ("; L=a) space.
Thus, the curve L=a = "(1 + )=("  2) is above the curve L=a = 2"=("  1  ).
D. Solving the linear dierence equations
We rst solve the linear dierence equation (11) as follows:0@w^Atw^Bt
z^At
1A = 1(1)t
0@1112
13
1A+2(2)t
0@2122
23
1A+3(3)t
0@3132
33
1A ; (D.1)
where ij are the characteristic vectors and i are constants determined by the initial and
terminal conditions. We derive the characteristic vectors. From the denition of characteristic
roots and vectors, we obtain0@J1   i J2 0J3 J4   i 0
J5  J5 J6   i
1A0@i1i2
i3
1A =
0@00
0
1A : (D.2)
Here, the calculation yields J1  1 =  J2 and J1  2 = J3. By using J1  1 =  J2, we solve
(D.2) as follows:
11 = 12 and 13 = 0:
By using J1   2 = J3, we solve (D.2) as follows:
22 =  L
A
LB
21 and 23 =
(LB   LA)J5
(  J6)LB 21:
With regard to 3, we solve (D.2) as follows:
(+ J3   J6)31 + J232 = 0 (D.3)
J331 + (+ J2   J6)32 = 0 (D.4)
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Rearranging (D.4) with respect to 31 and substituting this into (D.3) yields
(J6   )(  J6 + J2 + J3)32 = 0
J6    6= 0 and   J6 + J2 + J3 6= 0 imply that 32 = 0 holds. Thus, from (D.3) and 32 = 0,
we obtain 31 = 0. By setting 11 = 21 = 33 = 1, we can rewrite (D.1) as follows:0@w^Atw^Bt
z^At
1A = 1(1)t
0@11
0
1A+2(2)t
0@ 1 LA
LB


1A+3(3)t
0@00
1
1A ;
where 
  (LB   LA)J5=(  J6)LB.
E. Cycles generated by perfect international capital mobility
From (4), the unequal wage rates imply that the sum of the dividend rate it+1=v
i
t and the rate
of capital gains vit+1=v
i
t must be equalized between both countries; that is, v
A
t+1=v
A
t ? vBt+1=vBt
implies At+1=v
A
t 7 Bt+1=vBt . Suppose that wAt > wBt . From (3), vAt > vBt holds. If vAt+1=vAt >
vBt+1=v
B
t , the dierence between v
A
t and v
B
t becomes larger. However, (3) and (6) imply that
the steady state vit are equalized between both countries. In order to converge to the steady
state, vAt+1=v
A
t < v
B
t+1=v
B
t holds. (1), (2), (3), (4), and v
A
t+1=v
A
t < v
B
t+1=v
B
t yield
At+1
vAt
>
Bt+1
vBt
, vAt
 
vAt+1
" 1
< vBt
 
vBt+1
" 1
:
Hence, vAt > v
B
t and v
A
t+1=v
A
t < v
B
t+1=v
B
t imply v
A
t+1 < v
B
t+1. Similarly, w
A
t < w
B
t implies
that vAt < v
B
t and v
A
t+1 > v
B
t+1 hold. Summarizing these results, we can show that perfect
international capital mobility certainly generates cycles if the wage rates are not equalized
between both countries.
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